An Open Comment to Time Magazine and Mr. Zuckerberg

Dear Time Magazine,

Your selection for "person of the year" saddens me. I do not intend to diminish his contributions to society----or his professional success. Certainly his efforts and accomplishments are praiseworthy. But, in light of the humanitarian efforts put forth by Gates and Buffet this year, and the economic stability that the country is now beginning to see as a result of those with political power, and the various celebrities who have used their star power to bring attention to various diseases (like cancer or Parkinson’s), the various relief efforts (like Haiti), or various social causes (like gay rights), it is my humble opinion that there are other more qualified parties worthy of this honor and Time Magazine's praise. If Mr. Zuckerberg has any sense of civic responsibility or appreciation for those whose efforts and contributions to the betterment of man have surpassed his own, it is my hope that he will politely decline the honor via Time Magazine’s next issue---thereby encouraging Time Magazine to correct their oversight. Again, my intent is not downplay any of his efforts or success---he has achieved far more before age 30 than I will achieve in my entire lifetime; rather, I submit only that there are individuals who have done more for their fellow man, and I believe that their efforts might have been unintentionally overlooked. If you agree with the views expressed in this open comment, please consider posting it to your Facebook.

Respectfully,
Cris Broyles

Working Some Ideas Out---Reader Beware!

Preface: I have heard that Foucault's work is challenging to understand.  And, as I prepared that entry, I think I understand why. Please note this entry is just my attempt to work things out (a self-dialectic so to speak). I am not sure I have a real point in this entry, nor am I sure that I am even in the playing field with my assertions. So, you have been warned, LOL. Perhaps turn back now!

Dear Classmates,

As I was reading this week’s selections, I was particularly drawn in by Herrick’s description of Foucault (see pages 26 through 252). In reading this, I got the sense that Foucault might have seen “power” as a living entity. It seems to be the result of discourse, and it changes (as pointed out on page 247). So, in thinking about this, for me to “talk about something”/ “keep the discourse alive” is a way of conveying power (to the topic); if something is part of the active discourse in our lives, then, in a way, to me, I think it holds “power.”

An example that comes to mind is “the government bailouts.” Everyone was talking about them. The discourse was active—and ‘alive’—within our culture.  But now, it is not—it’s disappeared.  So, if you buy into my argument that “discourse” conveys power to the item being discussed, then my logic becomes if discourse confers power to something (a topic), then he who drives the discourse has the power to begin with. In our society, a lot—if not most—of the discourse is driven by the media and news reporting. Thus, I speculate momentarily that that the phrase “the power of the media” does carry weight!

But, as I read further, my thoughts changed. On page 251, we can take my ramblings a step further and see that Foucault argues that power does not originate with institutions—rather, institutions are subject to power.  To me, this means that in my example, “the media” doesn’t actually have “the power” either—they are conveyed it through the act of someone else—namely us, the viewers. We grant them “power” by turning them on and tuning in and by buying their newspapers, and by reproducing their views in our discourse about news topics.

So, as I work through these thoughts of power, I see a relationship between us and media in which power is cyclically transferred through action and discourse. I think this is but one example that could inductively represent a larger spectrum of ‘flowing’ power that I think Foucault was describing? But if power is constantly shifting and not really held in a fixed point, then does “power” really exist?  Doesn’t the term power convey “authority” and “control”? If it is in flux, then what I see is more a stasis system here in which all effect is a negotiation of changing positions. A simple way to think of it might be two people taking a long trip, and, every so often, they switch off who drives so the other can sleep. Overall, there is no absolute, overall “power” we think of in the traditional sense—there are only moments in which one (whoever is driving) holds a higher position over the other. For lack of a better term, it’s an illusion of power…because it is only temporary and will be conferred to other person when he drives....??

Okay, my head is spinning, LOL.

Cris

A Lesson Learned

Fellow Class Members,

In my entry for last week, I basically made the case that every communicative situation has a rhetorical underlining—some thought or action that the rhetor hopes to convey: it might be a laugh from a story or joke, or it might be a rethinking of a controversial topic.  But, if it is has purpose, then, I contended, perhaps erroneously, that it is rhetorical. For me, the two were synonymous. 

The ideas asserted by Bitzer, as presented in Herrick (2005), seem to further qualify and focus my thinking from last week. One theme, which is described on pages 230 and 231, exigence and audience, is that “change” is a key to having a rhetorical situation. For a situational to be rhetorical, it must have embodied something that is willfully changeable through communication (exigence) and, secondly, the audience must at least be open to change/able to impart a reaction to the utterance that works either toward or against the desired change/goal (okay, so I borrowed a word from Bakhtin to make my Bitzer point…).

Indeed, a weatherperson cannot negotiate with a tornado over tea to please leave the trailer park—so there is no exigence, and, consequently, the situation is not rhetorical based on Bitzer’s view----unless you perhaps count the internal dialogue one has as he or she mediates the utterances leaving his or her mouth, tapping into ideas from Bakhtin and Vygotsky.  And, likewise, speaking to classroom of 1^st graders about social security would not be rhetorical because they have no interest in the program at their age nor are they capable of bringing about or hindering a change---they are listeners with no power or interest in the topic.

So, what I have learned this week is that I was perhaps a bit overzealous in my claim last week: when you talk to a tornado or to children, you can have a purpose (which was all I said was needed for rhetoric), but, in thinking about Bitzer’s work, I think you need a second piece: the ability to actually bring about a change in action or thought: the weatherperson asking the tornado to leave the trailer park does have purpose—but, because the tornado isn’t actually capable of responding, then, it is not a rhetorical situation (again, discounting any internal dialogic process the weatherperson might have had with his or herself).

Best,

Cris

Audience, Harmony, and a Point of Contention.

In our survey of rhetoric thus far, we have seen a variety of themes: morality, justice, knowledge, delivery, proofs, etc. It was only a matter of time until we finally saw an emphasis on audience. I think we have seen this foreshadowed in the work of Aristotle and his work on connections to audience via logos, pathos, ethos, and kairos. This emphasis on audience is particularly evident in the work of Perelman and Olberechts-Tyteca (see pages 200 through 204 in Herrick), in which they define three audiences: self, specific party, and universal. To me, this “thinking through of audience” was important because in considering these audiences there is an internal dialogue that must go on in one’s mind as he or she reconciles the best way to appeal to the audience---sort of a “monolectic” of sorts, which I also think is a testament to Bakhtin’s work (see pages 233 through 235 in Herrick). I also am reminded of Cicero with rebuttals and envision of stasis points—which are each reflective of audience considerations. I think the recognition and use of these evaluative mechanisms in one’s mind is something that Plato would have approved of given that his plays, in many ways, are essentially external representations of the mental processes that one must work through in working arguments out (negotiations) and in developing strategies towards audience connection.

A second theme I think we’re seeing in contemporary rhetoric is the recognition of rhetoric’s role in nearly any communication type---even in science, which is something that might not have set well with Bacon; it is a shift toward harmony. Herrick makes this point especially evident in the text (see pages 207 through 214). In his discussion, one piece that really stuck with me is how much truth there is to how inquiry and advocacy go hand-in-hand. If you are starting with some sort of premise or hypothesis, then indeed, you have already laid the groundwork for some form of persuasion. Thus, for me, I took this to mean that there is a degree of subjectivity in all objectivity. Thus, if total objectivity does not exist, I think absolute truth cannot exist (aside from religious arguments/dependent on one’s beliefs), which I am sure would have been an affront to Plato.  I can hear the Sophists cheering as I pose that assertion.  And, if that premise is true, that there is subjectivity in objectivity, then rhetoric and science have to be viewed as companions in order to produce something that is defendable and representative of the perceived truth---they do not have to continue to be viewed at odds as previously asserted.

A final comment that I will make relates to the excerpt from English Composition and Rhetoric, by Bain, found in Bizzell and Herzberg. It was good to finally see the origins of writing modes (description, narration, exposition, and persuasion). However, I do not agree that persuasion is its own mode.  All narration, description, and exposition, have some point, some piece of knowledge to be shared. And, in that sense, because there is something to be garnered--a purpose---I would argue that persuasion is at work in each of the other modes; it might not be as explicit as the "research essay," but it is there---like Aesop’s’ fables. They are stories, but they aim to teach a lesson, and so there is persuasion.  So, I am not currently sold on the idea of classifying persuasion as its own mode. Perhaps it is because of my position of hindsight, but even in looking Bain’s own words (i.e., Part 21 on p. 1148 in Bizzell and Herzberg), he defines a paragraph as something that is “understood to possess Unity; which implies a definite purpose, and forbids digression…”  If there is purpose, then isn’t there also persuasion? Whether you’re writing to inform or entertain, you are still persuading, right?  “Learn this, Enjoy this…”

Those are my thoughts for this week.

Blog 10 - Ramblings about Articulation and Perception

               In thinking about this week’s readings, I am most moved by the excerpt from Locke’s essay, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. For me, the take-home message was two-fold: first, words are flawed (see pages 817 and 818) and, second, despite these flaws, words do have at least some value (e.g., communication to self [see page 817] and in civil/legal matters [see page 821]). Thus, overall, I believe Locke was arguing that while words may be capable of describing attributes and characteristics of things, sufficient for some types of discourse, they are not sufficient for explaining the deeper philosophical traits/attributes associated with the thing—thus, words cannot really convey truth. I think we saw this same struggle with Augustine, who embodied truth as God. In piggy backing this with what we learned from our studies in Sophistry, in which humans allegedly cannot even perceive full truths, then we see a double whammy in the transmission of knowledge: roadblock one is our own ability to perceive, and roadblock two is our ability to articulate the perception into something appreciable by others.

                Many people might not even be overtly aware of these limitations, but as Technical Communicators, realizing these limitations is, in my mind, the first step in trying to overcoming them—or at least ensuring a reduced signal loss through the discourse event (perceptionàarticulationà response from theother party). While I am not prepared to layout in great detail an actual method for reconciling these issues, I do think being aware of the problem/limitation/scope of our abilities is at least one step in the right direction, and I do offer one idea below that might help strengthen the signal.

                This idea of perception and articulation and the limitations we have, to me, suggest that there is some internal filtering mechanism—perhaps some we are unconscious of as we perceive, but something we are perhaps more conscious of as we articulate. We consciously choose words that we hope will best convey our intended meaning through an almost lightning-fast decision-making process that is often on autopilot.

                I surmise that if we consider “ethics,” momentarily, we can see the same process, but eventuated in slow motion---such that we are fully conscious of the mental weighing we are doing in determining our next step or action. If the processes are similar, I hypothesize, it might be possible to slow-down our language-thought processes in order to weigh wording options more carefully, and, in doing so, we might be able to ensure a more precise transfer from intended idea to articulated idea---thus, at least addressing some aspect of the overall knowledge transmission issues cited by Locke and the Sophists. In terms of enhancing our perception abilities, like Cicero, I can only deduce that a well-rounded education may be a way to help expand our minds and build neuron connections that might in some way deepen and broaden our understanding of the word around us, thereby enhancing our perception of it. 

Blog 9 - Eramus---More reclassification and Organization

With Ramus, last week, we saw a need to reclassify and separate (invention as part of dialectic, etc.), and, this week, we see this same theme carried along as Eramus tries to divide Copia into an "expression" component and a "subject-matter-expertise" component (see page 598 in Bizzell and Herzberg, 2001). I like the idea of thinking about the two separately from an analysis standpoint, but, when it comes to execution/delivery, I think they both go hand-in-hand and influence one another in real-time as the speech/writing unfolds. In looking at his second piece, the subject-matter component, I am somewhat surprised in the organizational approach he takes---I read them as independent methods with specific goals, which is, perhaps, how they were intended.

But, as I thought about the methods more, I began to see ways to reclassify his explanations, thereby carrying on the reorganization theme of Ramus and Eramus. For me, many of the methods could, perhaps, be combined under the umbrella of purposes. For example, I would combine Method 10 (see page 613) and Method 11 (see page 614) under the umbrella of/idea of ways to increase “rigor.”  Method 1 (see page 609) and Method 2 (see page 611), for me, deal with “clarity.” So, in seeing those connections, I began to mentally reframe how I would reorganize his methods to fit under ideas of specific purpose. To me, this would make his instructions more usable because when I look for ideas for revisions, I generally have a goal in mind, like “clarity” or “brevity,” and what I need is a “method” that will help me accomplish that; so, for me, if the methods would be reordered under themes of purpose first (i.e., “what the method can accomplish” as opposed to “what the method is”) and then “how the method works” second, they would make more sense. So, in continuing the traditions of Ramus and Eramus, I am now thinking about how I can take existing ideas and reorganize them in a way that is fresh and of use to authors.

Week 8

Hello Classmates,

Ramus’s Arguments in Rhetoric against Quintilian is interesting because it expresses disagreement with many of the ideas put forth by Quintilian and Aristotle—like the placement of invention, order, and memory in the rhetoric vs. dialectic pools. Page 694 (as presented in Bizzell and Herzberg, 2001), notes “invention is a process which supplies arguments”—it is not the argument itself; rather it is dialectic. Page 682 (as presented in Bizzell and Herzberg, 2001) reads: “But the writings of these scholars [Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian] reveal that while they indeed collected a lot of material, they did not evaluate it sufficiently, for in some places I look in vain for a syllogism. And they did not arrange it in a sufficiently fitting order, for elsewhere I find a lack of method.” Not since our readings of Plato and Isocrates (in their qualms with the Sophist’s views) do I recall such a direct “attack” on the view of a rhetorician by another rhetorician. Ramus appears to stress delivery and performance, akin to the Sophist, and he disagrees that with Quintilian in that he thinks there is, at least in part, such thing as a universal argument (this idea seems to begin on page 690, as presented in Bizzell and Hezber, 2001). Overall, as evidenced on page 681 (as presented in Bizzell and Herzberg, 2001), Ramus’s efforts seem to be focused on defining rhetoric apart from other discipline and influences: “We shall distinguish the art of rhetoric from other arts, and make it a single one of the liberal arts, not a confused mixture of all arts; we shall see its true properties, remove weak and useless subtleties, and point out things that are missing.”

Thus, I think what Ramus might be saying is that the logic behind the argument is dialectic whereas the presentation, the argument itself, is the rhetorical component—that delivery and style constitutes rhetoric only? And, I think we, perhaps see a similar line of thinking, i.e., a distinction from logic and presentation, in Bacon’s work The Advancement of Learning (as presented in Bizzell and Herzber, 2001, p. 744), “It appeared also that logic differeth from Rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close the other at large; but much more than this, that Logic handelth reason exact and in truth, and Rhetoric handleth it as is planted in popular opinions and manners.”

Thus, overall, as I think about this, I think we are seeing a push to return the term “rhetoric” back to the “cookery” Plato despised---but, I do not see it as a step backwards. We are still seeing a role for some of the deeper thoughts/implications that Plato and others valued—they are just being shifted more to the purview of “dialectic”; so we are still seeing the value of logic and reason.

So, though we are seeing some new ideas sprinkled in, overall, what I am seeing by Ramus and Bacon are largely attempts to reorganize ideas, which speaks to issue of classification—a large issue in (and a valuable tool in) technical communication.

Cris