Working Some Ideas Out---Reader Beware!

Preface: I have heard that Foucault's work is challenging to understand.  And, as I prepared that entry, I think I understand why. Please note this entry is just my attempt to work things out (a self-dialectic so to speak). I am not sure I have a real point in this entry, nor am I sure that I am even in the playing field with my assertions. So, you have been warned, LOL. Perhaps turn back now!

Dear Classmates,

As I was reading this week’s selections, I was particularly drawn in by Herrick’s description of Foucault (see pages 26 through 252). In reading this, I got the sense that Foucault might have seen “power” as a living entity. It seems to be the result of discourse, and it changes (as pointed out on page 247). So, in thinking about this, for me to “talk about something”/ “keep the discourse alive” is a way of conveying power (to the topic); if something is part of the active discourse in our lives, then, in a way, to me, I think it holds “power.”

An example that comes to mind is “the government bailouts.” Everyone was talking about them. The discourse was active—and ‘alive’—within our culture.  But now, it is not—it’s disappeared.  So, if you buy into my argument that “discourse” conveys power to the item being discussed, then my logic becomes if discourse confers power to something (a topic), then he who drives the discourse has the power to begin with. In our society, a lot—if not most—of the discourse is driven by the media and news reporting. Thus, I speculate momentarily that that the phrase “the power of the media” does carry weight!

But, as I read further, my thoughts changed. On page 251, we can take my ramblings a step further and see that Foucault argues that power does not originate with institutions—rather, institutions are subject to power.  To me, this means that in my example, “the media” doesn’t actually have “the power” either—they are conveyed it through the act of someone else—namely us, the viewers. We grant them “power” by turning them on and tuning in and by buying their newspapers, and by reproducing their views in our discourse about news topics.

So, as I work through these thoughts of power, I see a relationship between us and media in which power is cyclically transferred through action and discourse. I think this is but one example that could inductively represent a larger spectrum of ‘flowing’ power that I think Foucault was describing? But if power is constantly shifting and not really held in a fixed point, then does “power” really exist?  Doesn’t the term power convey “authority” and “control”? If it is in flux, then what I see is more a stasis system here in which all effect is a negotiation of changing positions. A simple way to think of it might be two people taking a long trip, and, every so often, they switch off who drives so the other can sleep. Overall, there is no absolute, overall “power” we think of in the traditional sense—there are only moments in which one (whoever is driving) holds a higher position over the other. For lack of a better term, it’s an illusion of power…because it is only temporary and will be conferred to other person when he drives....??

Okay, my head is spinning, LOL.

Cris

A Lesson Learned

Fellow Class Members,

In my entry for last week, I basically made the case that every communicative situation has a rhetorical underlining—some thought or action that the rhetor hopes to convey: it might be a laugh from a story or joke, or it might be a rethinking of a controversial topic.  But, if it is has purpose, then, I contended, perhaps erroneously, that it is rhetorical. For me, the two were synonymous. 

The ideas asserted by Bitzer, as presented in Herrick (2005), seem to further qualify and focus my thinking from last week. One theme, which is described on pages 230 and 231, exigence and audience, is that “change” is a key to having a rhetorical situation. For a situational to be rhetorical, it must have embodied something that is willfully changeable through communication (exigence) and, secondly, the audience must at least be open to change/able to impart a reaction to the utterance that works either toward or against the desired change/goal (okay, so I borrowed a word from Bakhtin to make my Bitzer point…).

Indeed, a weatherperson cannot negotiate with a tornado over tea to please leave the trailer park—so there is no exigence, and, consequently, the situation is not rhetorical based on Bitzer’s view----unless you perhaps count the internal dialogue one has as he or she mediates the utterances leaving his or her mouth, tapping into ideas from Bakhtin and Vygotsky.  And, likewise, speaking to classroom of 1^st graders about social security would not be rhetorical because they have no interest in the program at their age nor are they capable of bringing about or hindering a change---they are listeners with no power or interest in the topic.

So, what I have learned this week is that I was perhaps a bit overzealous in my claim last week: when you talk to a tornado or to children, you can have a purpose (which was all I said was needed for rhetoric), but, in thinking about Bitzer’s work, I think you need a second piece: the ability to actually bring about a change in action or thought: the weatherperson asking the tornado to leave the trailer park does have purpose—but, because the tornado isn’t actually capable of responding, then, it is not a rhetorical situation (again, discounting any internal dialogic process the weatherperson might have had with his or herself).

Best,

Cris

Audience, Harmony, and a Point of Contention.

In our survey of rhetoric thus far, we have seen a variety of themes: morality, justice, knowledge, delivery, proofs, etc. It was only a matter of time until we finally saw an emphasis on audience. I think we have seen this foreshadowed in the work of Aristotle and his work on connections to audience via logos, pathos, ethos, and kairos. This emphasis on audience is particularly evident in the work of Perelman and Olberechts-Tyteca (see pages 200 through 204 in Herrick), in which they define three audiences: self, specific party, and universal. To me, this “thinking through of audience” was important because in considering these audiences there is an internal dialogue that must go on in one’s mind as he or she reconciles the best way to appeal to the audience---sort of a “monolectic” of sorts, which I also think is a testament to Bakhtin’s work (see pages 233 through 235 in Herrick). I also am reminded of Cicero with rebuttals and envision of stasis points—which are each reflective of audience considerations. I think the recognition and use of these evaluative mechanisms in one’s mind is something that Plato would have approved of given that his plays, in many ways, are essentially external representations of the mental processes that one must work through in working arguments out (negotiations) and in developing strategies towards audience connection.

A second theme I think we’re seeing in contemporary rhetoric is the recognition of rhetoric’s role in nearly any communication type---even in science, which is something that might not have set well with Bacon; it is a shift toward harmony. Herrick makes this point especially evident in the text (see pages 207 through 214). In his discussion, one piece that really stuck with me is how much truth there is to how inquiry and advocacy go hand-in-hand. If you are starting with some sort of premise or hypothesis, then indeed, you have already laid the groundwork for some form of persuasion. Thus, for me, I took this to mean that there is a degree of subjectivity in all objectivity. Thus, if total objectivity does not exist, I think absolute truth cannot exist (aside from religious arguments/dependent on one’s beliefs), which I am sure would have been an affront to Plato.  I can hear the Sophists cheering as I pose that assertion.  And, if that premise is true, that there is subjectivity in objectivity, then rhetoric and science have to be viewed as companions in order to produce something that is defendable and representative of the perceived truth---they do not have to continue to be viewed at odds as previously asserted.

A final comment that I will make relates to the excerpt from English Composition and Rhetoric, by Bain, found in Bizzell and Herzberg. It was good to finally see the origins of writing modes (description, narration, exposition, and persuasion). However, I do not agree that persuasion is its own mode.  All narration, description, and exposition, have some point, some piece of knowledge to be shared. And, in that sense, because there is something to be garnered--a purpose---I would argue that persuasion is at work in each of the other modes; it might not be as explicit as the "research essay," but it is there---like Aesop’s’ fables. They are stories, but they aim to teach a lesson, and so there is persuasion.  So, I am not currently sold on the idea of classifying persuasion as its own mode. Perhaps it is because of my position of hindsight, but even in looking Bain’s own words (i.e., Part 21 on p. 1148 in Bizzell and Herzberg), he defines a paragraph as something that is “understood to possess Unity; which implies a definite purpose, and forbids digression…”  If there is purpose, then isn’t there also persuasion? Whether you’re writing to inform or entertain, you are still persuading, right?  “Learn this, Enjoy this…”

Those are my thoughts for this week.